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Abstract
Although a great deal has been written about charter schools, rather little
attention has been given to their funding.  The first part of this article
raises four current issues in the funding of regular public schools across
the U.S. and shows how these issues carry over to the funding of charter
schools.  The second part explores four additional issues that have arisen
in the funding of charter schools that go to the core identity of charter
schools and the nature of the students they enroll.  In both parts, extra
attention is paid to developments in California, one of the most active
charter school states.
  
In just over a decade, charter schools have grown from an idea to something of a movement,
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as more than 2000 charter schools now serve more than 250,000 in 34 states and the District
of Columbia—although this remains but a tiny fraction of American school children. 
Observers disagree whether charter schools have so far turned out to be a positive
development, although the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) has
recently released a fairly upbeat review of the literature concerning several key policy issues
relating to charter schools.1  Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that this article is not
meant as a brief in support of (or against) charter schools. Rather, the central point of this
article is that if charter schools are to become a regular part of the public school system in at
least a number of states, then the charter school funding issues discussed here need further
attention by both policy analysts in the political arena and school finance scholars.  It is also
perhaps worth emphasizing at the outset that this article does not purport to provide
solutions to all of the problems examined, although several of California's solutions are
presented.  Instead, it offers something of an agenda of charter school funding topics in need
of further policy discussion.
Part I: Four Public School Finance Issues and Their Connection to
Charter School Funding
One: Inter-district inequalities
            A. The issue generally
The funding of American public schools is historically based on local property taxes.  
Notwithstanding subventions from the state to local school districts, spending per pupil has
long varied from district to district.2   More specifically, ever since the 19th century,
spending on public education has importantly been a function of the per pupil wealth of the
local district, with low wealth districts most disadvantaged. 
Because of more than thirty years of litigation that began in the late 1960s,  this problem has
now been substantially ameliorated in some states3—states like Kentucky, New Jersey,
Texas, Wyoming and California4—although, even today in California, for example, some
wealthy communities like Beverly Hills continue to outspend most other districts.  Overall,
however, inter-district spending inequalities remain significant in most states and very large
in some states.5  (Of course, some  people consider wealthier districts entitled to spend more
and see "the problem" as the interference with that advantage by courts and state
legislatures.)  
            B. Carry-over to charter school funding
            Inter-district spending inequalities also create a dilemma for charter school funding.6 
Either, charter schools will be funded (typically by their local sponsoring districts) at a level
that relates to the spending level per pupil in the districts that charter them—this is the most
typical solution around the country.7  Or, they will be funded (perhaps directly by the state)
at some state average level of funding per pupil—this, for example, is increasingly the
California solution.8   Both solutions are problematic.  
If charter funding is tied to district spending per pupil, then charter schools may be very
differently funded based on who they can get to charter them. This sort of inequality among
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charter schools surely must seem unfair to many charter school operators, and especially so
as charter schools begin to lose their connection to families living in a particular district and
begin to serve children from a metropolitan area.  Moreover, this arrangement gives those
seeking charters special incentives to seek charters from some, but not other, districts.  The
disincentive applies most strongly with respect to low wealth/low spending districts, and
these are the very districts that charter school supports typically argue have the most to gain
from charter schools. 
On the other hand, if charter school funding is provided based on the state average per pupil
spending level in public schools, then this discourages the conversion of existing public
schools to charter schools in high spending districts, and it also makes it hard for new charter
schools to compete in districts that have high spending.  State average spending also
artificially encourages conversions to charter schools in low spending districts.  At the same
time, regular public schools in those low spending districts would understandably feel
unfairly disadvantaged as compared with charter schools with which they compete. 
Because California has substantially eliminated inter-district inequalities in the core funding
for public education, these inter-district problems for charter schools are far less there than in
most other states.  What this also shows is that if more states were to reduce their
inter-district inequalities, this would arguably be good both for public schools generally and
for charter school funding.  Indeed, it is plausible that the reform of the funding of regular
public schools could actually be effectuated through the spread of charter schools because of
the tensions and inconsistencies that are so clearly exposed by the finance of charter schools.
Two: Intra-district inequalities
            A. The issue generally
In many school districts, teachers (and other employee positions) are funded in this way. 
The school district awards each local school one teacher slot for every X number of pupils it
has.  Then, whatever that teacher's salary, it is fully paid for centrally.9  This means that
schools with higher paid (in general, more experienced) teachers get more money spent per
pupil on their core teaching staff than do those schools with lower paid teachers. 
Because of teacher seniority rights and other factors, this often means that schools serving
the lowest income pupils have the lowest spending per pupil on their core faculty.10  This is
vividly apparent in a community such as Oakland, California, where the higher achieving
schools in the Oakland hills generally have much better paid and more experienced teachers,
and the lower achieving schools serving low income children who live in the Oakland flats
tend to have large concentrations of lower paid teachers (many of whom are new to the job
and working with only temporary teaching credentials). 
This issue of intra-district inequalities arising from the way teacher slots are funded was
supposed to have been changed in Los Angeles in response to litigation.  And indeed, it
appears that the Los Angeles Unified School District has now infused schools that
previously spent less than the district average on core teacher salaries with substantial new
money, although those schools have not generally been able to attract their share of more
senior teachers and have instead used the funds for other core instructional purposes.11 
Despite this improvement in intra-district equity, this litigation does not appear to have been
copied elsewhere, and, in any event, intra-district inequalities are widespread throughout the
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nation.  (Again, some people don't see this as a "problem," because they favor higher per
pupil funding on core teachers in neighborhoods where wealthier families live, perhaps to
offset the funding advantages that other neighborhoods have because of categorical programs
aimed at children from low-income households.)
            B. Carry-over to charter school funding
Charter schools, as already noted, are generally funded on a per pupil basis, at least for the
core of their resources.12  When this method is used, it eliminates the issue of intra-district
spending inequalities just described—at least among charter schools.  But it also creates
some thorny incentives for existing public schools.  For example, per pupil funding at the
school level will probably make it financially quite unwise for local public schools to
convert to charter schools if their teachers currently are more experienced and higher paid. 
By contrast, schools with low teacher salaries on average have a special, perhaps artificial,
incentive to convert.
Funding charter schools on a per pupil basis but regular public schools on a teacher position
basis also means that, to survive financially, charter schools will probably have to rely upon
a large cadre of mainly newer and lower paid teachers as compared with the more attractive
schools in the district that chartered them.  This understandably seems unfair to the charter
schools.
It should be clear, then, that were regular public schools (like charter schools) financed on a
per pupil basis for their core funding, those schools with concentrations of higher paid
teachers would probably have to make do with fewer of them (which would imply a larger
average class size than today for regular public schools stocked with senior teachers).  But at
the same time, regular public schools with lower paid teachers would probably be able to
hire more teachers and reduce class size.  Such a change would both be better for the
neediest schools and would mesh regular school funding with charter school funding. 
Hence, just as noted earlier with respect to inter-district spending inequalities, it is also
plausible that financial the inconsistencies laid bare by the spread of charter schools will
actually stimulate the reform of public school funding within districts.                        
Three: Inadequate spending
            A. The issue generally
Despite its wealth and previously high level of spending on public education, California
currently spends much less per pupil than do comparably wealthy states, and overall spends
less than many school finance experts believe is necessary to facilitate high quality outcomes
for most students.13  Although state-to-state comparisons are difficult (because of different
accounting measures and different costs from place to place), roughly speaking California
schools today tend to spend around $6000 per pupil annually for current expenditure items,
whereas the figures in places like New Jersey and Connecticut are nearly twice that
number.14  Some blame this low level of spending on public schools in California on the
adoption in the 1970s of Proposition 13, which both sharply reduced local property tax
collections and restricted future increases;15 at least one scholar has blamed this decline in
relative spending in California directly on the school finance litigation that reduced
inter-district inequalities;16 still another scholar blames California's relatively low spending
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on the unwillingness of state politicians to invest in education as substantial a share of the
personal incomes of the people of California as are political leaders in many other states.17
Although California, given the overall wealth of its population, may be seen by some as
especially miserly towards its schools, it is hardly at the bottom in terms of public school
spending.  Indeed, there are many much poorer states around the country—like Louisiana,
Alabama and Mississippi—that also spend quite modestly on their public school pupils, even
taking their relatively lower labor and other costs into account.18 (Once more, of course,
some believe that too much money is already spent on public education in America and
would see "the problem" more in terms of "excessive" spending in states like Connecticut
and New Jersey.)
            B. Carry-over to charter school funding
  Given that public school budgets are seen as tight in many states, this means that many
states and local school districts do not feel themselves able to provide generous funding of
charter schools.  This shows up in a variety of forms.
                       
Start-up costs are often lacking or inadequate.19  These are the funds needed to launch
the school, to hire staff, and to outfit the school with furnishings and curriculum
materials in preparation for its initial enrollment of what is often an uncertain number
of pupils.  In some communities this issue has been reasonably well addressed because
charter schools are able to tap into special funding available from the federal
government, special state programs, and private foundation grants.20  Nevertheless,
start-up costs often remain a serious problem, especially for newly formed community
groups that seek to create charter schools.                        
1.
  In some communities, the fees charged for "oversight" and for "services" provided to
charter schools by their sponsoring districts have been set at quite high levels, and
some charter school supporters charge that this is likely to be especially true in
districts that are not all that keen to sponsor charter schools in the first place.21 
Although this issue remains quite troubling in some states, it has been at least partly
addressed in recent California statutory provisions which now both cap the oversight
fee and clearly give charter schools the ability to go to outside providers for the
business and other services they need.22 
2.
Apart from schools that convert from existing public schools, charter schools often
obtain little or no extra money to pay for their school buildings (whether those
buildings are leased or bought and paid for with mortgage funding).23  When this
happens, it means that charter schools often have to redirect perhaps 20% or more of
their core funding to pay for space, leaving them with what they believe to be too little
to pay for the ongoing educational program.24 Indeed, an inadequate supply of school
facilities may be the single largest stumbling block to the growth of charter
schools.25  
In California, however, the recently adopted Proposition 39 promises to resolve this
issue starting in 2003.  This initiative proposition insists that bodies approving charter
schools provide those schools either with adequate school buildings or the money to
rent or buy them.26  Yet, it remains to be seen how charter school rights under this
3.
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new law will play out.  Indeed, this new requirement might cause many districts to
decide to call a halt to chartering, even though California law is supposed to make it
difficult for districts to refuse a charter sought by any applicant with reasonably
sensible plans for its school.27  In any event, this problem remains a difficult one for
charter schools in other states
Despite the points just noted, it should also be appreciated that sometimes charter
schools have certain financial advantages.  For example, in states that provide uniform
per pupil funding for charter schools at all grade levels, charter schools have tended to
be created to serve elementary, not high school, pupils because younger children are
traditionally cheaper to educate.28 (California's program resists this trend by offering
charter schools more money per pupil for education at the higher grades.29)  A second
advantage in some places is that the calculation of the per pupil allocation to charter
schools includes sums that regular public schools spend on services, like
transportation, that charter schools might not provide.  Both of these points illustrate
the importance of determining the proper spending benchmark to which charter school
funding is to be tied.
Yet, as a general matter, until regular public schools are reasonably well funded, it is
probably unrealistic to expect generous funding for charter schools (although some
people don't consider this to be a "problem," believing that a system of charter schools
is only worth the governmental effort if those schools are as good or better than
regular public schools at a much lower cost to the taxpayers.)
4.
Four: Special needs funding
            A. The issue generally
Federal funding programs for educationally disadvantaged children (through the federal Title
I program) and for children with disabilities (through the federal special education
law—IDEA) implicitly assume that, if left to their own discretion, all too many local public
schools, districts and states would choose to treat these groups of children badly.  This
explains why Congress decided that civil rights sorts of protections are necessary for these
special needs children. One consequence, however, is that the federal restrictions attached to
the distribution of these "categorical" funds burden local schools in various ways.
First, in order to make sure that schools actually spend federal funds on educationally
disadvantaged children, federal regulations impose substantial reporting and accounting
burdens on schools.  These, in turn, have caused some schools to use the money in ways
other than they believe would be best for those children (although recent federal changes
have sought to reduce this problem).30  Second, even though the federal government has
recognized the special needs of disabled children, Congress has failed even to provide
adequate extra funds to deal with those extra needs.31  Yet, Congress has mandated that
those needs be met. As a result, there is considerable pressure on local school districts to
shift money otherwise earmarked for the rest of their children to these especially needy
pupils.  This shift is called "encroachment" by experts and is now thought to be quite
substantial in the special education area, with some observers claiming that as much as 25%
of the funds intended to regular education must be siphoned off to pay for the extras needed
by special education pupils—that is, required extras that are not paid for by federal and state
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categorical special education funds.32  Most people would surely agree that it is good that
these needy children get extra money, but it must be appreciated that, as a result, even less
money is left for other children, and that is generating some backlash among parents of
non-disabled pupils. 
            B. Carry-over to charter school funding
Many charter schools have had great difficulty getting their legally entitled share of state and
federal categorical funds from the appropriate state or local funding authority through which
federal and state categorical funds flow. 
In California now, this issue may have been fairly well resolved with respect to most of the
smaller state-funded categorical aid programs.  This is because charter schools are supposed
to obtain their share of those funds on a per capita basis—i.e., they receive so many extra
dollars for every pupil in the charter school without having to show that they actually have
enrolled pupils eligible for those extra categorical funds, without having to fill out all the
otherwise required forms, and without having to show how they have spent those extra
funds.33  This is very desirable for charter schools, both because the cash is much more
likely to be received in a timely matter and because the charter school can avoid the red tape
tied up in claiming and receiving funds from a large number of small categorical programs. 
But the receipt by charter schools of their share of federal Title I funds and funds for special
education pupils remain substantial issues.  One key factor to appreciate here is that some
charter schools either avoid enrolling, or don't really know much about teaching, special
education pupils with anything more than very modest disabilities.  Those schools are
viewed in some quarters as shirking their fair share of these pupils.  At the other extreme, it
must also be understood that other charter schools deliberately specialize in, or simply wind
up as magnets for, children with disabilities.34  The upshot is that there tends to be a very
uneven distribution of special education children in individual charter schools as compared
with the state average.35 
As a result, especially for high cost special education children, it is essential that extra
funding is provided to charter schools on an individual pupil basis.  That is, simply
increasing the charter school's per capita allocation based on the total number of children in
the school—as has been done in California for small categorical programs—would clearly
give too little money to some charter schools and too much to others.  Moreover, many
advocates on behalf of children with special needs remain skeptical about the good faith of
many charter schools in enrolling and fairly treating such children.  Hence, they are no more
willing to surrender regulatory controls over categorical funding for charter schools than they
are for regular public schools, even though such children only enroll in charter schools "by
choice."36
But actually arranging for the receipt by charter schools of extra funding for those needy
pupils has been difficult in many places and has tended to immerse charter schools in
bureaucratic controls from which they are, as a general matter, supposed to be free.  
Moreover, charter schools are new in many places and the necessary bureaucratic linkages
are just getting formed.  Furthermore, charter school operators are often unsophisticated in
timely completing forms and carrying out procedural activities that it has taken local public
schools years to master.  In addition, one suspects that some local districts are not all that
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eager to spread categorical funds to charter schools (just as they have been slow to pay over
federal categorical funds to eligible private schools), especially at a time when, as noted,
they receive inadequate amounts of these funds to serve the pupils enrolled in their own
regular public schools.  Indeed, the encroachment problem has caused some districts to want
to cut the basic funds they provide to charter schools (before adding back categorical funds)
on the ground that the district's own regular public schools are suffering from this problem. 
Needless to say, many charter school operators find this cutback in the funds they think they
should receive hard to accept, or even understand.  Until these matters are better resolved,
some charter schools will view themselves as mistreated whereas others will continue to
shun the neediest children.
Part II.  Four Special Issues of Charter School Funding
One: How to Count Charter School Pupils
As already explained, chartering bodies generally fund charter schools on a per pupil basis. 
This makes it essential for there to be a fair, and fairly run, system for counting how many
pupils the charter school actually serves.  But several issues have arisen, both because of
fraud committed by some charter schools and, arguably, unduly harsh counting mechanisms
imposed by some chartering bodies. 
Conceptually, the first decision is whether to count pupils on the basis of ADA (average
daily attendance), or ADM/ADE (average daily membership or enrollment), or yet some
other pupil-counting measure.37  This, of course, is an issue for regular public schools as
well as for charter schools. The difference is important.  For example, a school will have
more pupils enrolled than attend on any given day, and hence ADM/ADE counts, other
things equal, will bring in more money.  But in addition, notice that if ADM/ADE is used,
schools with high absentee rates, in effect, get extra funds that can be used to help them track
down pupils who are not attending regularly and to support efforts designed to coax those
pupils back into school full time. 
For charter schools, an ADM/ADE pupil count may create an incentive both to manufacture
enrollment numbers on the days ADM/ADE is counted and to treat as enrolled, but then later
ignore, regular truants.  On the other hand, if ADA is used, then charter schools have an
incentive to discourage the enrollment in the first place of those students who are likely to
have high absentee rates.38  This problem of perverse incentives is likely to be especially
troublesome for charter schools, as compared with regular public schools, because the
former inevitably will have more control over who their pupils are. 
One possible solution to this problem is to use an ADM/ADE count in the funding of charter
schools, but then to make sure that all enrollees are counted when assessing student
achievement at the school, thereby making it undesirable for charter schools to ignore
enrollees who become truant.  The bottom line is that, absent a well-crafted solution to this
issue, the charter school funding mechanism can wind up having an unintentionally large
impact on which pupils charter schools seek to attract.
Two: Schools that seek to enroll distance learners/home schoolers
Nationwide it is now estimated that perhaps as many as 2% of children are home schooled
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by their parents.39  Should those parents who home school their children be able to group
together as a charter school in order to obtain financial support from the government?  This
is not really an issue for regular public schools, because these children conventionally are
simply not enrolled in "school" (although some enterprising public school officials, as a way
of garnering more state funding for the district, have figured out how to enroll in their
"independent study" programs some children who are, in effect, home schooled). 
If home schoolers are permitted to join charter schools, this will increase the cost of public
education.  This new cost alone will make some state officials want to resist funding charter
schools established to serve these sorts of children. 
Nonetheless, in some states, including California, home-schooled children may be served by
charter schools.  This has created several problems, however.  Part of the problem stems
from the fact that many have come to the conclusion that these children can be served at a
public cost level much below that of other children and, in turn, below the per pupil
allocation normally made for children enrolled in charter schools (assuming that the
teacher/parents will not be paid for their work).
Consider this example.  Suppose that the state is prepared to provide $5,000 annually for
each pupil enrolled in a charter school, whether home schooled or not.  But suppose that
reasonably good educational support for the home schooling family can be provided at a cost
of, say, $3000 per pupil per year.  That leaves $2000 left over, and some have seized upon
this difference, concluding that there is money to be made.  That "profit" might be skimmed
off by the chartering school district, at least if it can get its hands on the $5000 per pupil
from the state and then provide only $3000 per pupil to the charter school serving home
schoolers.  Alternatively, the $2000 profit might be skimmed off by the charter school
operator (which itself might be a "for-profit" educational management organization).  In this
scenario, the charter school gets the full $5000, but only spends $3000 on the pupil.
Beyond the matter of educating home schoolers "on the cheap," it has turned out, in
California at least, that some districts have chartered schools to serve home schoolers who
live at a great distance from the charter school, and furthermore, in several instances, the
distance-learning-based charter school's center of operations itself has been located far from
the sponsoring district.40  This scenario causes at least two worries.  One is that pupils will
be claimed as enrolled in a charter school when they in fact are not in any way connected
with the charter school.  In California recently, a variation on this theme apparently
happened, when the same children were claimed as enrollees of two different charter
schools, both of whom claimed to manage their education from afar.41  A second problem is
that the sponsoring district's oversight of the charter school may be minimal.
These various concerns, fueled in part by scandals linked to home-schooling-based charter
schools, have caused some in California to want to eliminate the participation of home
schoolers in charter schools and others to favor providing a lower per pupil payment to
charter schools serving such pupils.42  And yet, the argument on the other side is that these
children, like all other children, are supposed to be entitled to free public education. 
Moreover, many home-schooled children seem to be learning reasonably well, and hence it
seems unfair to some to target them for worse treatment, especially when lots of those
children who are home-schooled might actually benefit substantially from public spending
on their behalf.  This spending could, for example, be for curriculum development and
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curriculum materials, training and supervision of their parents, computer technology, and the
like.  Yet, even some strong charter school supporters who abstractly identify with families
who home-school their children are conflicted, fearing that scandals involving these schools
put the charter school movement at risk.  As a result, the place of these children in the
charter school system remains a difficult issue.
Three: Monitoring charter school spending, budgeting, auditing, etc.
The basic idea behind charter schools is that they are supposed to be autonomous.  That is, it
is broadly agreed that the core principle defining charter schools is that they are generally to
be free from regulation in order to be able to experiment, to be flexible in the way they
manage their operations, to respond quickly to their customers, and so on.43  In return for
this autonomy, charter schools usually are asked to demonstrate academic outcome results
for their children, but that too is supposed to be measured without too much interference
with the school's independence.44  And yet, there is at the same time understandable concern
that some charter schools will be financial rip-offs.  They might not properly spend on their
pupils the public money they get; they may go broke in the middle of the term and leave
children and families in the lurch; and so on.   These fears have led to auditing, monitoring,
reporting, and other requirements. 
Principals and teachers in regular public schools, of course, may also complain about these
same controls.  But, in contrast to charter schools, freedom from regulation is not
traditionally so centrally part of their school's identity (although school site control, of
course, has long been a goal of some reformers of regular public schools).  In any event,
some charter school advocates believe that excessive financial controls are becoming the
back door way that the charter school movement is undermined. 45    Indeed, the history of
public school funding may provide a revealing lesson here, since increased state funding has
generally brought with it more regulation of local school district operations.
Four: Supplemental funding of charter schools
Some charter schools are required to live off the basic funding they get from their chartering
body.  As noted already, many have to devote too much of that to pay for their building. 
Other charter schools, as noted, have the advantage of operating in a building that has been
given to them, or loaned to them, for free.  This creates "haves" and "have-nots" among
charter schools.  But this general problem of financially better and worse off charter schools
is not limited to buildings. 
For both start-up costs (mentioned earlier) and for ongoing operations, some charter schools
have substantial supplemental funding and others do not.  To the extent that this extra
funding comes from government grants, one can at least hope that the funds will be fairly
awarded to the most deserving charter schools.  But much of this supplemental funding
comes from private donors.  Perhaps one should not begrudge a charter school that is able to
obtain this extra funding.  And the availability of this supplemental funding may provide
charter schools with a healthy incentive to convince private donors that they have a high
quality program deserving of their support. 
Yet, the uneven distribution of outside funding creates inequalities of the sort that are also
created among regular public schools when, for example, some obtain extra funding from
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local privately-financed public school foundations and others do not.  At least for regular
public schools, however, those foundations currently make a relatively small difference for a
relatively few school districts.
But for charter schools, there is a much greater concern that no charter school will have
much of a chance to succeed unless it has substantial extra outside funding, at least in its
early years.  This, in turn, means that certain sort of charter school initiators are far more
likely to survive than others, with local grass roots groups most likely to be in the worse off
category.   For many who envisioned that charter schools would be a kind of democratic,
local community response to regular public schools, this is likely to be disheartening.
Conclusion
Several of the funding issues facing charter schools stem from broader issues underlying the
funding of public schools generally.  Oddly enough, if the charter school system grows and
legislatures struggle to rationalize the charter school funding mechanism, there is at some
chance that these changes will, in turn, force attention to, and changes in, the funding of
regular public schools.  Other charter school funding issues that go to the heart of what
autonomy charter schools will truly have and what sorts of pupils charter schools will serve.  
This overview shows that charter school funding is far too important a topic to leave to
technical experts and deserves the careful attention of the wider school reform community.
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